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HONG KONG COURTS' JURISDICTION To ENFORCE




This article considers jurisdictional issues arising when a local resident's intellectual
property rights are infringed by Internet contents uploaded overseas. It considers the
implications of the double actionability rule in such cases, and questions the view
that local courts do not have jurisdiction to enforce foreign intellectual property
rights. The article outlines the jurisdictional rules relating to Order 11 of the Rules
of the High Court, discusses the application of the rules to cases involving IP rights
and explores how the borderless nature of the Internet impacts on the application.
Introduction
Private international law addresses three questions: Which state's courts have
jurisdiction? Which state's law applies? How to enforce the courts' judgments?
This paper discusses whether Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction over in-
fringement of intellectual property rights in cases where the defendant is
domiciled or ordinarily resident outside Hong Kong, the right in question is
created overseas or the infringing act takes place overseas. Particular atten-
tion will be paid to jurisdictional issues arising from the borderless nature of
the Internet.
Hong Kong Jurisdictional Rules
The Courts' Jurisdiction
Under-the common law, an action in personam' lies against a person only if
SJD (Doctor of Legal Science) student, University of Hong Kong. The author wishes to record his
gratitude to his teachers Ms Alana Maurushat and Dr Kevin Pun, who imparted to him most of the
knowledge required for the writing of this paper. Dr Pun also pointed out the gaps in the first draft.
Thanks are due to the anonymous reviewer, whose comments have led to revisions in several areas.
For any deficiency which still remains, the responsibility lies with the author alone.
"An action in personum is designed to settle the rights of the parties as between themselves, eg an
action for damages for breach of contract, an action for an injunction in a tort case, or an action for
possession of tangible property." - PM North and JJ Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private Interational
Law (London, Edinburgh, Dublin: Butterworths, 1999), 13th ed., p 285. It is to be distinguished from
action in rem, which is brought to vindicate a right available against all persons - see ibid., p 325.
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he has been served a claim from within the jurisdiction.2 A person who is
otherwise not subject to jurisdiction (eg not domiciled or present in Hong
Kong) will be regarded to have submitted to jurisdiction if he has been served
a writ (eg received by his solicitor) and does not challenge it. Alternatively,
he may dispute jurisdiction and apply to the court, under Order 12 rule 8 of
the Rules of the High Court, to set aside the writ or stay the proceedings.
The court's jurisdiction is extended by Order 11 of the Rules of the High
Court, which is modelled on Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in
England. Rule 1 of Order 11 provides that "service of a writ out of the juris-
diction is permissible with the leave of the Court" if the action begun by writ
falls within the circumstances specified in paragraphs (a) to (p) of sub-rule
(1). Under rule 4(2), "[n]o such leave shall be granted unless it shall be made
sufficiently to appear to the Court that the case is a proper one for service out
of jurisdiction under this Order".
Stages in Considering an Order 11 Application
The Hong Kong authority for service out of the jurisdiction is Wo Fung Paper
Making Factory Ltd v Sappi Kraft (Pty) Ltd,I which sets out the different stages
in considering an application under Order 11. A more recent English author-
ity is Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi ]omhouri Islami Iran,' where the
House of Lords laid down a two-stage test for considering applications under
rules 1 and 4. The court has to decide, first, whether the facts of the case are
such that it has jurisdiction under one of the heads in rule 1. If so, the second
stage is for it to use its discretionary power to decide whether to exercise
jurisdiction. In Hong Kong, the Seaconsar test was applied in, for example,
Inchcape ].D.H. Ltd v Baltrans Exhibition & Removal Ltd and Air China
Corporation.'
Double Actionability Rule
Where an application under rule 1 for service out of the jurisdiction relates to
tort, the appropriate head is sub-paragraph (f): "the claim is founded on a tort
and the damage was sustained, or resulted from an act committed, within the
jurisdiction". If the act in question is committed outside Hong Kong, whether
the court has jurisdiction may depend on the applicability or otherwise of the
double actionability rule, which was first set out in Phillips v Eyre.' The case
2 Ibid., p 296.
Ibid.
4 [19881 2 HKLR 346.
[1994] 1 AC 438.
6 Ibid., speech by Lord Golf at 456H-457A.
7 Case No. HCCLOO0257/1996 (Court of First Instance, 27 Oct 1997). Available on Judiciary's website
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk, last visited on 30 Nov 2004.
8 (1870-71) LR 6QB 1.
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related to an action for assault and false imprisonment committed in Jamaica.
A point for decision was whether the plaintiff, who was precluded from ac-
tion in Jamaica by the legislation there, had a right to action in England.
Wiles J, delivering the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, stated the fol-
lowing often quoted rule:
"As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged
to have been committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First,
the wrong must be of such a character that it would have been actionable
if committed in England; ... Secondly, the act must not have been justi-
fied by the law of the place where it was done."'
These days, the rule is often attributed to Boys v Chaplin."o In Boys, the
plaintiff and defendant were both members of the British Armed Forces sta-
tioned in Malta at the time when they were involved in a car accident. The
question for consideration was whether damages for personal injuries should
be assessed according to the law of Malta, or that of England. The House of
Lords adopted the rule in Phillips and held that the plaintiff was entitled to
the higher damages available under the English law. Since then, there have
been discussions on what clarification, if any, Boys made to the rule in Phillips.
In Red Sea Insurance Co. Ltd. v Bouygues S.A. and Others, Lord Slynn said in
an unanimous judgment that in Boys their Lordships' reasons "varied to such
an extent that both academic writers and judges in other cases have expressed
doubt as to whether there can be extracted from the speeches one binding
ratio decidendi."" Furthermore, being a "general rule", it admits exceptions
and "the books ... indicate that many questions may need to be resolved in
regard to the application of the exception ... ". Boys did clarify the second
part of the Phillips rule to the effect that for the foreign act to be justiciable in
England, it must be "actionable in civil proceedings even if it was not neces-
sary for the act to be characterised as a 'tort' under the foreign law"." Therefore,
criminal liability would not suffice.
It is not clear whether the double actionability rule is one of jurisdiction,
choice of law or both. The question in Phillips was whether Jamaica legisla-
tion "could ... have the extra-territorial effect of taking away the right of
action in an English court"" (which involved the questions whether foreign
9 Ibid., at 28-29.
10 [19711 AC 356.
11 [1995] 1 AC 190, at 198F.
12 Ibid., at 206D.
13 Ibid., at 199E.
14 See n 9 above.
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law applied and whether English court had jurisdiction) while the conten-
tion in Boys was whether English law should apply instead of foreign law.
One of the judges in Boys, Lord Wilberforce, considered the first condition in
the rule (ie actionable if committed in England) to relate to choice of law but
not jurisdiction." Another judge, Lord Donvan, apparently intended the rule
to apply to jurisdiction, which in turn determined the choice of law, when he
said: "I would dismiss the present appeal on the ground that an English court
was competent to entertain the action under the rule in Phillips v Eyre and
that once it had done so it was right that it should award its own remedies."'"
According to Sender, in practice, "Commonwealth countries have tradition-
ally refused to take jurisdiction over actions for infringement of foreign patents
(and other intellectual property rights) as a consequence of the double
actionability rule"."
In the United Kingdom, double actionability as a choice of law rule was
abolished, with effect from 1 May 1996, by the Private International
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 except in relation to defamation
claims." As the Act has no effect in Hong Kong, the rule continues to apply
here. For example, in United Phosphorus Ltd v China Merchants Shipping &
Enterprises Co. Ltd, which dealt with tortious acts taking place outside Hong
Kong, the Court of Appeal took the rule as a factor in deciding that Hong
Kong was an appropriate forum.' 9 However, in a more recent case Guangzhou
Green-Enhan Bio-Engineering Co. Ltd and Another v Gree Power Health Prod-
ucts International Co. Ltd and Others, the Court of First Instance referred to
the rule as a cause of action (and not as a rule on choice of jurisdiction or
choice of law), which is difficult to understand.20
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the numerous cases
applying, clarifying and elaborating the rule and its exceptions.' Those of
particular relevance to enforcement of intellectual property rights will be
discussed in the appropriate places below. In view of Lord Donovan's
1 See n 10 above, 385C-387A.
16 Ibid., at 383G-383H.
17 Marta Pertegas Sender, Cross-border Enforcement of Patent Rights (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002) para 2.55.
18 See Gareth Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd FSR [1999] 525, at 560. By virtue of section 13, the
Act does not affect defamation claims.
19 Civil Appeal No. 244 of 1998 (Court of Appeal, 11 Feb 2000), at para 16(ii). Available on Judiciary's
website www.judiciary.gov.hk, last visited on 22 Apr 2005.
20 Action No 4651 of 2002, 2802 of 2003 and Miscellaneous Proceedings No 74 of 2004 (Court of
First Instance, 8 Apr 2005), at paras 307 and 308. Available on Judiciary's website www.judiciary.
gov.hk, last visited on 23 Apr 2005.
21 For a discussion of the rules arising from Phillips v Eyre and Boys v Chaplin, please see Lawrence
Collins (ed), Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) 12th ed,
pp 1487-1549.
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words, 22 Sender's finding" and the Hong Kong Court of Appeal's decision
in United Phosphorous,24 the rule is regarded to be one of jurisdiction as well
as choice of law in this paper.
Forum Conveniens
When a case has passed the first stage of the Seaconsar test (ie jurisdiction has
been sufficiently established under rule 1(1) and there is a serious issue to be
tried), the court will decide, based on the doctrine of forum conveniens, whether
to exercise jurisdiction. The doctrine was clarified by the House of Lords in
Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd." Adopting Lord Goff's speech
in Spiliada on the principles and the steps to be adopted, the HKSAR Court
of Appeal has set out a three-stage test in Hunter JA's oft-quoted speech in
Adhiguna Meranti, as follows:
"The court now has to answer a single question namely: 'Is there some
other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appro-
priate forum for the trial of the action, ie in which the case may be tried
more suitably for the interests of the parties and the ends of justice' ...
(W)e still think it convenient for the purposes of analysis to view the
problem in three separate stages namely:
(1) Is it shown that Hong Kong is not only not the natural or appropri-
ate forum for the trial, but that there is another available forum
which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong ...
The evidential burden is here upon the applicant ...
(1I) If the answer to (1) is yes, will a trial at this other forum deprive the
plaintiff of any 'legitimate personal or juridical advantages'? ... The
evidential burden here lies upon the plaintiff ...
(ILL) If the answer to (LI) is yes, a court has to balance the advantages of
(1) against the disadvantages of (II) .
22 See n 16 above.
23 See n 17 above.
24 See n 19 above.
25 [1987] 1 AC 460.
26 The Owners of Cargo lately laden on board the Ship or Vessel "Adhiguna Merant" v The Owners of the
Ships or Vessels "Adhiguna Harapan" and Others, [19871 HKLR 904, at 907, per Hunter JA. The
principles were followed in subsequent Court of Appeal cases, eg Ho Siu Pui and Others v Yue Sheng
Finance Ltd and Another, Civil Appeal No. 361 of 2002 (Court of Appeal, 30 Jan 2003). Available
on Judiciary website www.judiciary.gov.hk last visited on 25 Apr 2005.
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Application of Jurisdictional Rules to Intellectual Property Rights
Do Hong Kong Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Foreign Intellectual Property
Rights?
The jurisdictional rules apply to cases with a foreign element. Where the
proceedings are to enforce intellectual property rights, the foreign element
may be: the right in question is created outside the jurisdiction, the alleged
infringing act takes place outside the jurisdiction or one of the parties is not
domiciled or habitually resident within the jurisdiction. "Until very recently,
it was clear and not controversial that an English court had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate foreign intellectual property".2 7 The "clear and not controversial"
view, which was cast into doubt by the UK Court of Appeal's decision in
Pearce v. Ove Arup Partnership Ltd," had its origin in the House of Lords'
ruling in British South Africa Co v Companhia de Mocambique and others" on
the distinction between transitory and local actions. Local actions are those
which relate to immovable property.30 They should be tried by the local courts.
Therefore, as the action in that case was based on trespass of land in a foreign
jurisdiction, English courts did not have jurisdiction. Intellectual property is
regarded as immovable property. Mocambique has been referred to in some
cases as the authority for the view that infringement of intellectual property
which takes place in a foreign country is outside the jurisdiction of English
courts."
The hitherto "clear and not controversial" view relates, in fact, to copyright,
trademarks and patents only. Even before Pearce, there were precedents of
English courts enforcing goodwill and reputation which subsisted in foreign
countries." Analyses - to be conducted in the later parts of this paper - of the
cases in which the courts refused to enforce foreign copyright, trademarks or
patents suggest that the decisions can be explained by either the territorial
limitation of these rights or the double actionability rule.
In assessing whether a case passes the first stage of the Seaconsar test, the
deciding factors, as far as the enforcement of intellectual property rights is
27 Adrian Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (London and Hong Kong: LLP, 2002) 3rd ed,
para 4.07. See also James J. Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private Interna-
tional Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at pp 280-306.
28 [20001 Ch 403; [1999] FSR 525.
29 [1893] AC 602.
30 lbid., at 622.
31 For a discussion of the Mocambique rule in relation to intellectual property, see Christopher Wadlow,
Enforcement of Intellectual Property in European and International Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1998), paras 6-48 to 6-159.
32 John Walker v Ost [1970] RPC 489 and Alfred Dunhill v Sunoptic [1979] FSR 337 CA.
372 Ng Hon Wah (2005) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 35 Hong Kong L.J. 372 2005
concerned, are the place where the right is created and the place where the
alleged infringing act occurs. The places of domicile of the parties are
irrelevant, except that where the defendant is domiciled or ordinarily resi-
dent in Hong Kong, the court has jurisdiction as of right and the plaintiff
does not have to invoke the courts' extended jurisdiction under Order 11.
When the court is satisfied that it does have jurisdiction, it will proceed to
exercise its discretionary power. At that stage, the places of domiciles are but
one of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether Hong
Kong is the forum conveniens.
As will be discussed below, the place where a right subsists may be - but is
not necessarily - confined to the place where it is created. The jurisdictional
issues arising from the extra-territorial enforcement of intellectual property
rights will be discussed in relation to the following scenarios:
Scenario A: A Hong Kong citizen's right created in Hong Kong is alleg-
edly infringed through an act committed by a foreigner outside
Hong Kong.
Scenario B: A Hong Kong citizen's right created outside Hong Kong is
allegedly infringed through an act committed by a foreigner
in Hong Kong.
Scenario C: A Hong Kong citizen's right created outside Hong Kong is
allegedly infringed through an act committed by a foreigner
in the place where the right subsists.
Scenario D: A Hong Kong citizen's right created in Hong Kong is alleg-
edly infringed through an act committed by a foreigner in
Hong Kong.
The above scenarios are not exhaustive. They are sufficient to illustrate
the significance of the place of the right and place of the infringing act, thus
paving the way for a subsequent discussion on the jurisdictional issues arising
from the borderless nature of the Internet.
Scenario A - Right created in Hong Kong allegedly breached by act outside
Hong Kong
Intellectual property rights can be divided into two categories: those created
by statutes and those by common law. The former includes copyright, trade-
marks and patents. Goodwill and trade secrets belong to the latter.
Where a local copyright is alleged to have been infringed by a restricted act
committed overseas, there is not a serious issue to be tried. This is because
under sections 3 and 22(1) of the Copyright Ordinance (Cap. 528), copy-
right is the exclusive right to do specified acts "in Hong Kong". It is strictly
territorially based and simply cannot be infringed by an act performed outside
Vol 35 Part 2 Hong Kong Courts' Jurisdiction 373
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the jurisdiction." Def Lepp Music and others v Stuart-Brown and others," which
is sometimes referred to in discussions on whether English courts can enforce
foreign IP rights, is a case where a writ served outside the jurisdiction, for an
alleged infringement of English copyright in Luxembourg and Holland, was
set aside on the ground that "copyright under the English act is strictly
defined in terms of territory". 5
The Copyright Ordinance has been described as "revolutionary" 6 by
Pendleton in that under sections 177 and 178," a work of the nature speci-
fied in section 2 (ie original literary works, etc) qualifies for copyright
protection regardless of the status of the author or the place of publication.
Other jurisdictions in the world require a connecting factor: either the
author is a national, citizen or resident of the member states of a relevant
international convention or the work is first published in such a member
state. At present, virtually all jurisdictions in the world, including Hong
Kong, come under the umbrella of the Berne Convention." Therefore, in
Scenario A, except in the unlikely event of the foreign jurisdiction being
not a member state of the Convention, the Hong Kong plaintiff's work
enjoys copyright created (and subsisting) not only in Hong Kong, but also
in the foreign country concerned by virtue of the law there. If so, the case
will come under Scenario C.
The right to registered trademarks is created under the Trademarks Ordinance
(Cap 559), which does not contain any express territorial limitation similar to
sections 3 and 22(1) of Cap 528. In particular, section 18 of Cap 559 which
provides for infringement does not expressly confine the infringing acts to those
committed in Hong Kong. Nor, on the other hand, is there anything in Cap
559 to suggest that the rights conferred by the ordinance have extra-territorial
application. It is an established statutory interpretation rule that unless a con-
trary intention appears, an enactment is taken not to apply to acts taking place
outside the jurisdiction." No such contrary intention appears in respect of
3 There are, however, at least two exceptions to the territorial limitation of the Copyright Ordinance.
First, s 22(2), ie to authorise, without the copyright owner's licence, another to do a restricted act.
The corresponding provision in the UK legislation was held to have extra-territorial application -
ABKCO Music & Records Inc. v Music Collection International Ltd. & Another, [1995] RPC 657.
Second, s 120 contains an express provision making it an offence to make infringing copies outside
Hong Kong for export to Hong Kong otherwise than for private or domestic use.
3 [1986] RPC 273.
Ibid., at 275 (line 45).
36 Michael D. Pendleton, "The Danger of Protecting Too Much: A Comparative Analysis of Aspects
of Intellectual Property in Hong Kong, Britain and the United States" [2000] EIPR 69, at 71.
37 Under sections 177 and 178, copyright subsists in a work if either the author is an individual domi.
ciled "in Hong Kong or elsewhere" or "a body incorporated under the law of any country" or the
work "is published in Hong Kong or elsewhere"
38 Pendleton, (n 36 above) at 71.
3 F.A.R. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (London; Dublin and Edinburgh: Butterworths,
1997) 3rd ed, p 283.
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section 18. Therefore, no infringement can be committed outside Hong Kong
and there is not a serious issue to be tried under Scenario A.
The same conclusion applies in respect of a Hong Kong patent allegedly
being infringed outside the jurisdiction. The territorial limitation of the Pat-
ents Ordinance (Cap 514) is clear from sections 73 and 74, which confer on
a patent holder "the right to prevent all third parties not having his consent
from doing in Hong Kong" specified acts. Indeed, the territorial nature of
patents is well established internationally.40 A case to confirm the territorial
limitation of the ordinance is Shanghai Reeferco Container Co. Ltd v Waggonbau
Elze Gmbh & Co. Besitz Kg.4' Based on the premise that the Patents Ordi-
nance has no extra-territorial application, the court held that section 89 does
not apply to threats of infringement proceedings made outside Hong Kong."
Goodwill is protected by the common law on passing off, which consists of
three elements: the plaintiffs goodwill or reputation being damaged or likely to
be damaged by the defendant's misrepresentation, which leads or is likely to
lead the public into believing that his goods and services are the plaintiff's."
The only sub-paragraph in Order 11 rule (1) which applies to a passing off
action is: "(f) the claim is founded on a tort and the damage was sustained, or
resulted from an act committed, within the jurisdiction". Passing off is a tort.
That the alleged infringing act, ie the misrepresentation, takes place outside
Hong Kong raises the question whether the double actionability rule applies
and Hong Kong courts may exercise jurisdiction only if the act amounts to a
civil wrong in the place where it is committed.
In Intercontex and Another v Schmidt and Another," the Chancery Division
applied the double actionability rule and held that "the essence of passing off
is misrepresentation" and misrepresentations made in Germany were not jus-
ticiable in the United Kingdom in the absence of any evidence that they
were actionable in Germany. Based on the case, Cheshire and North remarks
that for jurisdictional purposes, passing off "is seemingly committed in the
country in which the misrepresentation takes place"." The point is debatable.
In Intercontex, no mention was made throughout the judgment as to whether
the plaintiffs had any goodwill and if so, where and what detriment was suffered.
Passing off would not have been established even if the misrepresentation
had beeri made in the United Kingdom. The case, therefore, cannot be relied
upon as an authority for the view that a misrepresentation taking place
40 Sender (n 17 above), at paras 2.15 - 2.28.
41 Action No 3341 of 2003 (Court of First Instance, 20 Feb 2004). Available on Judiciary's website
http//egalref.judiciary.gov.hk, last visited on 7 Dec 2004.
42 Ibid., para 33.
43 Reckitt & Colnan Products Ltd v Borden Inc. and others, [1990] RPC 341 (HL) at 406.
44 [1988] FSR 575.
45 Cheshire and North (n 1 above), p 636.
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outside the jurisdiction is not justiciable locally. A better view, it is suggested,
is this. The wrong of passing off lies in the detriment or likelihood of detri-
ment to the goodwill or reputation. In terms of time, this is the last of the
three ingredients. The wrong is completed, and hence the tort committed, at
the place where the detriment is sustained.
In interpreting the UK equivalent of rule 1(1)(f), the UK Court of Appeal
held, in Metall & Rohstoff A.G. v Donaldson Lufkin& Jenrette Inc. and Another,
that where a tort was committed within the jurisdiction, the courts could
disregard the rule in Boys. 46 It follows that in a case of passing off under Sce-
nario A, Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction under rule 1(1) (f) regardless of
whether the misrepresentation is civilly actionable in the place where it occurs.
As regards trade secrets or confidential information, it is submitted that from
the policy point of view and in the absence of authority to the contrary, the
right - and hence, the obligation - to maintain confidentiality should tran-
scend national boundaries. In Hong Kong, the obligation not to use or disclose
confidential information without the owner's consent falls under the com-
mon law on breach of confidence. Is breach of confidence a tort for
jurisdictional purposes? The UK Court of Appeal held that it was breach of
an equitable obligation and not a tort.48 Hence, the breach in Scenario A
does not fall under rule 1(1)(f); nor is any other head applicable. The wrong
being not justiciable in Hong Kong means that the plaintiff probably cannot
obtain a remedy elsewhere if the infringing act occurs in a place where it is
not civilly actionable. This is unfair, especially in cases where the wrongdoer
is quite clear about his obligation but breaches it for his personal gain. The
classification of an act under tort or equity is merely a matter of legal history.
There appears to be no justification in principle or policy for allowing the
technical distinction to determine whether a wrongdoer may be brought to
justice. Short of amending rule 1(1), perhaps other ways can be found to
overcome the technical hurdle.
In Hong Kong, in Linda, Chik-ling Koo and Another v Lam Tai Hing,o Bokhary
J, as he then was, made the "revolutionary pronouncement"5 0 that "[a] man's
confidential information is his property"." He held:
46 [19901 1 QB 391, at 446D and 447D.
47 The leading case on breach of confidence is Coco v Clark [1969] RPC 41.
4 Kitechnology B.V.and Others v Unicor GmbH Plastmaschinen and Others, [1995] FSR 765, at 778. See
also ISC Technologies Ltd. and Another viames Howard Guerin and Ohters, [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 430,
at 432.
4 [1992] 2 HKLR 314.
50 The description is that of Michael Derek Pendleton and Alice Lee, Intellectual Property: A Guide to
the Law in Hong Kong: With Reference to the Developments in China (Hong Kong: Butterworths Asia,
2001), p 188, footnote 108. The dominant view of English judges is to deny confidential informa-
tion as property in the normal sense - see William Cornish and David Llewelyn, Intellectual Property:
Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), 5th ed., paras
8-50 to 8-54.
51 See n 49 above, at 341 (line 38).
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"A man's confidential information is his property. The courts have juris-
diction to protect such property from misuse. Such jurisdiction is not
confined to cases in which such information has been imparted in confi-
dence or to cases in which an obligation to keep the same confidential
arises under contract. Any use, including self-use by the wrongdoer, fol-
lowing any misappropriation - whether by force, menaces, trickery or
stealth - is, in general, misuse which is liable to be restrained or made the
subject of an order for damages or an account."52
What Bokhary J apparently had in mind was the tort of conversion of
property or a new, similar cause of action." With Koo v Lam as the authority,
a plaintiff in Scenario A can found a case on the tort of misuse of confidential
information, which would fall under rule 1(1) (f). Where is the tort committed:
at the place of misuse or at the place where damage is sustained? For conver-
sion of property, the gist of the action lies in dealing with property in a manner
inconsistent with the owner's right." Therefore, when the property in ques-
tion is information, the wrong is completed, and the tort committed, at the
place of the misuse. Under the double actionability rule, Hong Kong courts
have jurisdiction only if the misuse is civilly actionable in that place. An-
other way to look at the question is this. In Metall, the court, in analysing
where the tort of inducing or procuring breach of contract was committed,
concluded that it was in substance committed where damage was sustained."
That conclusion is, of course, based on the facts in that particular case. It
does provide support, however, for the argument that in Scenario A, the tort
of misuse of confidential information is committed in Hong Kong. If so,
following Metall, 6 the double actionability rule should be disregarded and
Hong Kong courts will have jurisdiction regardless of whether the misuse is
civilly actionable in the place where it occurs.
The duty of confidence may arise in an express or implied term in a
contract." Putting aside Bokhary J's "revolutionary pronouncement", the
possible injustice from classifying such duty as an equitable obligation may,
in some cases, be addressed by reframing a breach of confidence or of fidu-
ciary duty as a breach of contract. Such cases will fall to be considered under
rule 1(1)(d). If the contract is made in Hong Kong (rule 1(1)(d)(i) and
(ii)), is governed by Hong Kong law (rule 1(1)(d)(iii)) or provides for the
52 Ibid. (lines 38-44).
5 See Halsbury's Laws of Hong Kong (London and Hong Kong: Butterworths, 2000), s 380.404 for
what constitutes conversion.
5 Ibid.
5 See n 46 above, at 447H-449E.
56 See n 46 above.
5 Mark Berthold and Raymond Wacks, Hong Kong Data Privacy Law: Teritorial Regulation in a Borderless
World (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 2nd ed, p 152.
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Court of First Instance to exercise jurisdiction (rule 1(1)(d)(iv)), Hong Kong
courts have jurisdiction regardless of where the infringing act takes place.
Scenario B - Right created outside Hong Kong allegedly breached by act in
Hong Kong
Copyright, trademarks and patents created and subsisting in other jurisdic-
tions in the world are, like those of Hong Kong, territorially limited." The
same reasoning as discussed in Scenario A above applies here: a foreign
copyright, trademark or patent simply cannot be infringed by acts committed
outside that foreign country. However, as stated in Scenario A, Hong Kong
operates an open qualification system under which any published or unpub-
lished work by any author in the world qualifies for copyright protection
here.59 Therefore, in Scenario B, the alleged infringing act, though not
breaching any foreign copyright, will be actionable for breaching the Hong
Kong copyright - Scenario D.
For passing off, Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction under rule 1(1)(f)
because "the claim is founded on a tort and the damage ... resulted from act
committed, within the jurisdiction" and under rule 1(1)(b), ie "an injunction
is sought ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing anything within
the jurisdiction".60 This is predicated on the premise that the act constitutes
a civil wrong in the foreign place where the goodwill or reputation subsists. If
it is not an actionable wrong under the relevant foreign law, there is not any
serious issue to be tried. However, in case the plaintiff's business is one of
international reputation, it stands a good chance of being regarded to have
goodwill subsisting in Hong Kong. The local courts are lenient in inferring
that a reputable business overseas has goodwill in Hong Kong and that the
goodwill is likely to be damaged, even though it has not been conducting
trading activities here.' Such cases come under Scenario D.
The reference in the four scenarios to an IP right subsisting in a jurisdic-
tion implies that the right is protected by only the law of the jurisdiction
where it is created. That reflects the actual situation in the case of copyright,
trademarks, patents and to a lesser extent, goodwill. When it comes to
trade secrets, it may be argued that the obligation to keep confidence has no
58 See Christopher Wadlow, Enforcement of Intellectual Property in European and International Law
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), para 1-26.
5 See n 37 above.
60 According to Cheshire and North (n I above) p 299, "[tjhis head is wide enough to cover a perma-
nent injunction restraining the threatened breaches of contract and torts within the jurisdiction"
Apparently, there is no authority on whether or not the head may apply to breach of confidence or
breach of fiduiciary duty.
61 See JC Penney Co. Inc. and Another v Penneys Ltd and Another [1979] FSR 29 and Ten-ichi Co. Ltd.
viancar Ltd & Others [1989] 2 HKC 330.
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territorial limitation and that, therefore, an unauthorised use or disclosure in
Hong Kong of confidential information acquired by the defendant elsewhere
is a breach under local law and hence justiciable here. The "Spycatcher" case
may be prayed in support of this view. In Her Majesty's Attorney General v
South China Morning Post Ltd and others,62 the Hong Kong Court of Appeal
restored the injunction restraining the defendants from publishing further
excerpts of a book written by a senior British intelligence officer in breach
of the UK Official Secrets Act. The decision was made on the ground of
breach of confidence. The court was apparently applying Hong Kong law"3
though this point is not clear since in this particular case, the law and na-
tional interest of Hong Kong happened to be the same as those of the "foreign"
jurisdiction. 4 The case is consistent with the view that Hong Kong courts
have jurisdiction over a case founded on breach of confidence or breach of
fiduciary duty in Scenario B. Given that the defendant is domiciled outside
the jurisdiction, the plaintiff may apply for leave under rule 1(1)(b): "an in-
junction is sought ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing anything
within the jurisdiction (whether or not damages are also claimed in respect of
a failure to do or the doing of that thing)".s
The revolutionary pronouncement in Koo v Lam that information amounts
to property and its unauthorised use constitutes a tort may not be shared by
the laws of other jurisdictions. However, if it is accepted that trade secrets
and confidential information are not territorial in character, it is arguable
that in Scenario B, the tort is committed in Hong Kong regardless of whether
(and if so, where) any detriment is caused to the owner of the information."6
The courts, then, would have jurisdiction under rule 1(1) (b) and (f).
If an action against unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential infor-
mation is founded on a breach of contract, the case in Scenario B is justiciable
in Hong Kong under rule 1(1) (b), (d) and (e) if the contract is made within
the jurisdiction, is governed by Hong Kong law or contains a term to the
effect that the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction. If the contract does
62 Civil Appeal 114 of 1987 (Court of Appeal, 18 Sep 1987).
63 The Court of Appeal made no reference to any private international law issue. On the other hand,
it referred to the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong and took into account
the legitimate interests in Hong Kong - see Ibid., pp 7, 8, 11, 16, 21, 28 and 29.
64 When the UK Government sought similar injunction in Australia, the application was denied on
the ground that it would be invidious for the courts to pass judgment on the claim made by a foreign
Government in a matter of public law. The plaintiffs argument that the case was one of private law
was not accepted by the court. See Attorney-General (UK) v Heinernann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd
and Another, 78 ALR 499 High Court of Australia.
65 See n 60 above.
66 In Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 111, at 281G-H, Lord Goff delib-
erately avoided the question whether confidential information might be regarded as property. He
also left open the question whether detriment to the plaintiff was an essential ingredient of an
action for breach of confidence.
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not meet any of these conditions, the case is justiciable under rule 1(1)(b)
and (e).
Scenario C - Right created outside Hong Kong allegedly breached by act
outside Hong Kong
Scenario C is similar to the facts in Tyburn Productions Ltd. v Doyle"7 and
Gareth Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd.68 The former is sometimes regarded
as an authority for the view that English courts do not have jurisdiction to
enforce foreign intellectual property rights while the latter casts doubt, if not
changes, that view. 9 In Tyburn, the plaintiff, a UK company, sought a decla-
ration that its film to be televised in the US would not infringe the respondent's
copyright in the US. Vinelott J refused the application on two grounds. First,
"the question of the validity, title to and of infringement of a trademark fall
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts of the country by the laws of
which the trademarks was created. Again there can be no distinction for this
purpose between copyright, patent rights and trademarks"." Secondly, any
decision by the English courts would be an exercise of futility because their
decision would not be binding on the US courts." In Pearce, the plaintiff was
an English architect who instituted actions against defendants, some domi-
ciled in the UK and others in Holland, for infringing his Dutch copyright
through an act committed in Holland. The Court of Appeal was "satisfied
that the Mocambique rule does not require the English court to refuse to en-
tertain a claim in respect of the alleged infringement of Dutch copyright".7n
The court distinguished Tyburn on the ground that there, the court "was in-
vited to investigate the existence and validity of the rights claimed; not to
decide whether there had been an infringement of rights the existence and
validity of which were not in issue".73 The Tyburn decision, the Court held,
was correct because of the second reason therein, ie any decision would be an
exercise of futility. 4
Pearce is a case under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, which
does not apply to Hong Kong. It cannot be taken as a direct authority to
establish that Hong Kong courts do have jurisdiction over the enforcement
of foreign copyright - and for that matter, trademarks and patents - in
Scenario C. However, at the very least, it has cleared the hurdle posed by
67 [1990] RPC 185.
6 [1999] FSR 525.
69 See Briggs (n 27 above).
70 See n 67 above, at 195.
71 Ibid., at 196.
72 See n 68 above, at 562. For Mocambique, see n 31 above.
I lbid., at 557.
7 Ibid.
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Mocambique and Tyburn to the Hong Kong courts' exercise of jurisdiction
over such cases.
The next question is which sub-paragraph in rule 1(1) applies to such
cases. The only candidate is sub-paragraph (f): "the claim is founded on a tort
and the damage was sustained, or resulted from an act committed, within the
jurisdiction". In Scenario C, since the infringing act is committed overseas,
the damage must be sustained in Hong Kong for the cases to fall under this
subhead. It being given in the scenario that the plaintiff is domiciled in Hong
Kong, such damage is assumed in the following discussion."
There are two further questions on the applicability of rule 1(1)(f). First,
copyright, trademarks and patents being created by statutes, can the breach
of such rights be appropriately classified as a tort? Second, is the double
actionability rule met in Scenario C?
In Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, "tort" is defined as "a civil
wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages,
and which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a trust
or other merely equitable obligation" (emphasis added)." In Hong Kong, an
action against breach of copyright, trademarks or patents is based not on the
common law but on the statutes creating the rights. It may be argued that
such a breach does not amount to a tort. In Europe, for the purpose of article
5(3) of the Brussels Convention, the expression "tort, delict or quasi-delict"
was held by the European Court to refer to liability other than that under
"contract" and hence , patent infringement was held by the UK Court of
Appeal to come within article 5(3).n1 The definition of tort was examined in
the Australian case Commonwealth Bank of Australia v White. " Byrne J of the
Supreme Court of Victoria opined that "the word takes on a different mean-
ing depending upon its context".79 After an extensive examination of scholarly
works, judicial rulings and history of the English jurisdictional rule, he held
that for the purpose of service out of the jurisdiction, torts included liabili-
ties arising from the breach of statutory duties." His reason was similar to
that of the European Court, ie the term "tort" was used in the jurisdictional
rules to distinguish it from "contract"." In the Hong Kong case Shanghai
7 For a discussion of the problems over deciding whether damage is sustained within the jurisdiction,
see Cheshire and North (n 1 above) pp 306-308.
76 RFV Heuston and RA Buckley, Salmon and Heuston on the Law of Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1996), 21st ed, p 13. The book is an authoritative scholarly work. Its view that breach of
confidence does not amount to a tort was adopted by the UK Court of Appeal in Kitechnology
(n 48 above) at 778 and Metal (n 46 above) at 474 D.
7 Molnlycke AB and another v Procter & Gamble Ltd and others [1992] 4 All ER 47 at 52 a-g.
78 [1999] VR 681.
l9 ibid., at 697.
80 ibid., at 697-700.
81 lbid., at 698.
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Reeferco, the Court of First Instance apparently took it for granted that breach
of section 89 of the Patents Ordinance is a tort for the purpose of Order 11,
rule 1(1) (f) .82 In the circumstances, there appears to be strong support for
the view that breach of copyright, trademarks and patents is a tort for the
purpose of the jurisdictional rule. The possibility that it may be classified
differently in the jurisdiction where it occurs is immaterial because "in
practice, classification of the cause of action is effected on the basis of the
law of the forum".
On the question whether a tort under Scenario C would satisfy the double
actionability rule, the elusiveness of the rule has been touched upon in the
earlier part of this paper. In the context of intellectual property, Wadlow
considers that the first limb of the rule as formulated in Phillips, ie "the wrong
must be of such a character that it would have been actionable if committed
in England", is open to four alternative interpretations, which vary in the
degree of difficulties posed to the plaintiff." One interpretation is to require
that the infringing act, if taking place within the jurisdiction, must be action-
able here on ground of contravention of the relevant foreign legislation. If
the interpretation were adopted, the rule could never be satisfied because, as
discussed above, the relevant legislation does not have extra-territorial effect.
Wadlow favours the approach which is the least severe to the plaintiff: "All
the court should do is notionally transport the facts of the case to England
with their surrounding circumstances and ask whether they would have been
actionable here"." In other words, if an act taking place in a foreign country
is alleged to have breached a right subsisting there, the question to ask should
be: Assuming the act to take place in England and the relevant legislation to
be that of England, would it be an actionable wrong known to the English
law? If the answer is in the affirmative, the first limb of the Phillips rule is
satisfied. Wadlow's approach, if adopted, would remove the obstacle which
may be posed by the double actionability rule to the courts' exercising juris-
diction over breaches of intellectual property rights committed in the foreign
countries where the rights subsist. In the absence of any authority to support
or negate the approach, one may seek help from policy consideration as to
whether the courts should intervene.
In Plastus Kreativ AB v Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. and
another," the UK Patents Court struck out those parts of a claim which
82 See n 41 above. In paras 27 to 28, the judge discussed the application of the double actionability
rule, which inphes he regarded the alleged contravention to be a tort.
83 Cheshire and North (n I above), p 38.
84 Christopher Wadlow, Enforcement of Intellectual Property in Europe and International Law (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1988), para 6-108.
85 Ibid., para 6-113.
86 [1995] RPC 438.
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sought a declaration that there was no breach in Germany and France of a
patent registered in the two countries. One of the court's reasons was that
the declaration, if granted, would result in the public in those countries
paying higher prices as a result of the monopoly created by the patent. The
decision should therefore be left to the courts of those countries." Sender
advances two objections against such policy consideration. First, intellec-
tual property rights should not be distinguished from other rights on which
the courts assumed jurisdiction in private international law. Secondly, the
interests of the litigating parties could be better served if the disputes about
a patent registered in more than one country were to be adjudicated in one
single forum." Sender's first objection echoes the view by Austin. To counter
the argument that a foreign copyright is the exercise of sovereignty by the
foreign country concerned, Austin points out that "the jurisdictional
prohibition may be antithetical to respect for property rights created by a
foreign sovereign" because the prohibition has the effect of shielding the
infringers." The sovereignty argument, if accepted, would lead to the con-
clusion that all foreign rights should be non-justiciable, which is against
modern private international law.90
The policy considerations point to the widening, rather than restricting,
of the courts' jurisdiction. After all, that does not mean that the courts will
necessarily assume jurisdiction in a particular case. It means, merely, that the
courts may proceed to assess whether Hong Kong is the forum where "the
case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends
of justice"." It is submitted that the double actionability rule should be inter-
preted along the most lenient approach suggested by Wadlow so that a breach
of copyright, trademark or patent in Scenario C will be justiciable under rule
1(1)(f).
For passing off, there are two precedents to support justiciability in the
circumstances of Scenario C. In John Walker v Ost, England was held to be
the proper forum for passing off committed in Ecuador of goodwill subsisting
in Ecuador, where the act was civilly actionable.92 In Alfred Dunhill v Sunoptic,
the plaintiff applied for injunction to cover England and other places where
his goodwill was likely to be damaged. The court ordered an injunction to
cover, in addition to England, only Switzerland because there was no evi-
dence of the misrepresentation being actionable in the other places."
87 Ibid., at 447.
88 Sender (n 17 above) paras 2.27 and 2.28.
89 GW Austin, "The Infringement of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights", (1997) 113 LQR 321,
at 330.
90 Ibid.
91 See n 25 above, at 476C-D.
92 [19701 RPC 489.
93 [19791 FSR 337 CA.
Vol 35 Part 2 Hong Kong Courts' Jurisdiction 383
HeinOnline -- 35 Hong Kong L.J. 383 2005
In regard to trade secrets, the considerations are similar to those in
Scenario B above. The courts have no jurisdiction in a case founded on
breach of confidence. If it can be framed as a tort in conversion of property,
rule 1(1 )(f) will apply and the case justiciable in Hong Kong provided it is
justificiable in the place where the unauthorised use or disclosure is committed.
Or, if the unauthorised use or disclosure amounts to breach of an implied or
express term of a contract, Hong Kong courts may exercise justification
under rule 1(l)(d) if the contract is made in Hong Kong, is governed by
Hong Kong law or contains a term to the effect that the Court of First
Instance in Hong Kong has jurisdiction.
Scenario D - Right created in Hong Kong allegedly breached in Hong Kong by
a foreign defendant
The only foreign element here is that the defendant is domiciled in a for-
eign country, thus requiring leave for a writ to be served out of the
jurisdiction. Assuming the courts accept that the breach of the statutory
rights of copyright, trademarks and patents to be a tort, it is justiciable
under rule 1(1)(f), as is an action for passing off. For reasons discussed in
Scenario B, an action for unauthorised use or disclosure of trade secrets,
if founded on breach of confidence, will come under rule 1(1)(b). If it is
founded on the conversion of property, the courts have jurisdiction under
rule 1(1) (b) and (f). Or, in cases where the unauthorised use or disclosure
amounts to a breach of contract, the courts have jurisdiction under rule
1(1)(b) and (e) - and also, (d) if the contract satisfies one of the four
conditions in that sub-paragraph.
Jurisdictional Issues Created by the Internet
New Dimensions
The Internet has added at least two dimensions to the jurisdictional is-
sues over the enforcement of IP rights. First, the borderless nature of the
Internet means that even in a simple case of unauthorised copying, there
may be issues about where the right subsists, where the infringing act is
committed and whether any damage is sustained in Hong Kong. Secondly,
the Internet has given rise to new forms of infringing acts - hypertext
links, framing, domain names etc. The laws on such acts are far from settled.
The same act may be actionable if committed in one jurisdiction but not
in another. As a result, the double actionability rule may prevent the Hong
Kong courts from having jurisdiction over infringing acts taking place
outside Hong Kong.
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Copyright
The impact of the Internet on the jurisdictional rules is most felt in the area
of copyright. Let us start by a simple scenario:
Miss Chan, a permanent resident of Hong Kong, kept a paper diary in
Hong Kong and uploaded some entries onto www.opendiary.com.
Mr Lee, domiciled in a foreign country XY, downloaded some entries
by using a computer in XY and used them to form part of a story, which he
uploaded onto his own website www.lee.com.xy.
Miss Chan's friend in XY printed the story on Mr Lee's website and
sent it to her. Using that, her paper diary and a printed copy of her open
diary as the evidence, she applied under Order 11 rule 1 to serve a writ on
Mr Lee out of the jurisdiction for infringement of her copyright. Will she
succeed?
The evidence she presented shows that she is the author, and hence copy-
right owner, of her open diary, under the Copyright Ordinance. The
Ordinance, however, has effect in Hong Kong only. Mr Lee's act of
unauthorised copying committed in XY is therefore not actionable under the
Ordinance. However, if, as is likely, XY, like Hong Kong, is a contracting
party of the Paris Act 1971 of the Berne Convention and hence its copyright
law protects "Hong Kong works",94 Mr Lee would have infringed Miss Chan's
copyright subsisting in XY when he copied a substantial part of her open
diary in his computer, even temporarily. The legal situation is like Pearce."
Miss Chan can obtain leave under rule 1(1)(f), for the infringement of her
copyright in XY, if she can present a good arguable case that:
(a) the copying and publication by Mr Lee amount to restricted acts in
XY and do not fall within any permitted use (corresponding to the
fair dealing in Hong Kong) under the relevant XY law;
(b) the infringement of copyright can be classified as a tort;
(c) the tort has resulted in damage sustained in Hong Kong (on the ground
that the copyright holder is domiciled in Hong Kong); and
(d) Hong Kong is the more appropriate forum than XY.
94 The Paris Act applies to Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of China - see World
Intellectual Property Organisation website http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?
cnty-id=931C, last visited on 12 May 2005. The Berne Convention has undergone several revi-
sions - see Kevin Garnett, Jonathan Rayner James and Gillian Davis, Copinger and Skone James on
Copyright (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 14th ed, Chapter 24. Each revision is a separate
treaty - see The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on Reform of the Law Relating to
Copyright (Topic 22), Nov 1993, para 1.5. For meaning of "Hong Kong works", see n 37 above.
9 See n 68 above.
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The prospect of her obtaining leave is not good. In regard to condition (c)
above, there is a shortage of authority on what damage has to be sustained in
Hong Kong in order to invoke rule 1(1) (f).96 In the hypothetical example,
she might have difficulty in substantiating the damage she has suffered. In
any case, for a case alleging the contravention of XY law by an XY resident
with the only connection with Hong Kong being the plaintiff's domicile, the
court is likely to decline jurisdiction."
However, in case the server holding Mr Lee's infringing story is located in
Hong Kong, Miss Chan may argue that the infringing act was committed in
Hong Kong. The copy held in the Hong Kong server constitutes copying (in
contravention of sections 22(1)(a) and 23(2) and (6) of the Copyright
Ordinance)" and making available copies to the public (in contravention of
sections 22(1)(d) and 26). As it is a case of the plaintiff's Hong Kong right
being infringed in Hong Kong by a foreign defendant, the court is more likely
to exercise jurisdiction under rule 1(1) (f). Or, in case the server is located in
another jurisdiction AB which is also a contracting party to the Paris Act and
assuming AB law contains similar provisions as sections 22, 23 and 26, the
court will have jurisdiction over Mr Lee's infringement in AB of Miss Chan's
AB copyright. The defendant, being domiciled in XY, will have less incen-
tive to argue that Hong Kong is not the appropriate forum. If he does argue,
his chance of success is less than if the server is located in XY.
It appears, then, that whether the court will exercise discretion in favour
of Miss Chan's application depends on a fortuitous factor, ie the location of
the server holding Mr Lee's infringing copy. If the story ends there, the law is
unsatisfactory. Let us now go back to the scenario of Miss Chan's server being
located in Hong Kong and Mr Lee's in XY to see whether anything can be
done. In Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Cana-
dian Association of Internet Providers," one of the questions dealt with by the
Supreme Court of Canada was whether an Internet "communication" could
infringe Canadian copyright only if the host server was located in Canada.
The court held that:
"A telecommunication occurs when music is transmitted from the host
server to the end user. An Internet communication that crosses one or
more national boundaries 'occurs' in more than one country, at a minimum,
96 See Fawcett and Torremans (n 27 above), p 249.
97 ibid., pp 42-43.
98 See Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. and another v Lik Sang International Ltd and others, Court of
First Instance, Action No. 3583 of 2002, 11 Apr 2003, at para 48. Available on Judiciary, website
www.judiciary.gov.hk, last visited on 12 May 2002.
9 [2004] 2 SCR 427.
(2005) HKLJ386 Ng Hon Wah
HeinOnline -- 35 Hong Kong L.J. 386 2005
the country of transmission and the country of reception. To occur in
Canada, a communication need not originate from a server located in
Canada.""oo
After referring to the copyright laws in US, Australia and France, the
court stated that:
"Accordingly, the conclusion that Canada could exercise copyright
jurisdiction in respect both of transmissions originating here and trans-
missions originating abroad but received here is not only consistent with
our general law ... but with both national and international copyright
practice." 0
That is a highly persuasive conclusion to support Miss Chan's contention
that her copyright subsisting in Hong Kong and in other jurisdictions (which
are contracting parties to the Paris Act 1971 and where Mr Lee's website can
be accessed) has been breached and rule 1(1) (f) applies. She appears to stand
a good chance of persuading the court that in order to avoid a multiplicity of
proceedings, Hong Kong is the forum conveniens.
Now, to add a little complexity to the scenario. The story which Mr Lee
uploaded onto his website included extracts from not just Miss Chan's open
diary, but also from other diarists' uploaded in different parts of the world.
Many had instituted actions against him for infringement of copyright,
infringement of moral right or defamation in various jurisdictions. In Hong
Kong, after Miss Chan had obtained leave under rule 1(1)(f), Mr Lee applied
under rules 4(2) and 12 to set aside the leave. His ground was that to avoid
the multiplicity of proceedings in respect of the same story, all those actions
should be tried in the one jurisdiction with the largest number of plaintiffs.
That is not Hong Kong. Whether the court will be persuaded by Mr Lee
depends on the facts of the case. In the interests of Miss Chan and also some
other plaintiffs, it is hoped that the actions against Mr Lee can be regarded as
separate ones as they concern the rights of different individuals who were not
connected to each other except for their rights having been infringed by
Mr Lee. Otherwise, Miss Chan, even if her copyright is infringed in Hong
Kong, may have to try her case in a distant jurisdiction.
The ruling in Society of Composers etc, if adopted in Hong Kong, would be
a great help to Miss Chan's application for a writ under rule 1(1)(f). Our
hypothetical example involves the straight-forward infringements of copying
1Wo Ibid., at 451.
1o1 Ibid., at 462.
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and making available copies to the public. There are more sophisticated copy-
right infringements arising from the Internet. Since Shetland Times Ltd v
Dr. Jonathan Wills and another,' there have been cases, mainly in the US,
relating to hyperlink, a very convenient Internet facility for surfers. The com-
mon belief that "deep linking" represents copyright infringement does not
have legal support."o3 If ever "deep linking" were ruled to be infringement,
could any action be taken against those linking websites which operate abroad
(ie relative to the websites, the copyright of which has been infringed)? For
framing, another form of alleged copyright infringement, the dispute of the
US case Washington Post v Total News Inc. was settled out of court.' 4 Again,
even if framing amounts to an infringement, can any action be taken against
any "infringing" acts committed outside the jurisdiction where the copyright
subsists? Similar observations are applicable to other potential disputes about
Internet copyright.
In the event of any such a dispute arising between a Hong Kong plaintiff
and a US defendant, the latter may argue that other factors being equal, the
US is the forum conveniens because the courts and counsel there have more
experience over Internet disputes than those in Hong Kong. If the argument
is accepted and subject to the choice of law rules in private international law,
the US may extend its dominance to the regulation of the Internet.
Patents
As far as patents are concerned, the Internet does not appear to have created
any particular jurisdictional issues.
Trademarks
Registered trademarks, like copyright, are territorially based. Disputes cross-
ing jurisdictional boundaries involve mainly the use of domain names which
may mislead surfers and consumers into thinking that the websites in ques-
tion belong to enterprises with established reputation. Many such cases are
resolved through the ICANN dispute resolution mechanism without recourse
to legal proceedings."' A question arising from the Internet is whether the
102 [1997] FSR 604.
103 Mark Sableman, "Link Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years", (2001) 16 Berkeley
Technology Law Journal, 1273, at 1291-1297.
104 "Framing ... involves combinations of materials from different sources. In a typical use, two or more
webpages, all created by the same web publisher, are displayed together in separate, independently
scrollable frames." Ibid., at 1298
105 ICANN stands for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. Information on the
body and its dispute resolution mechanism can be found in http://www.icann.org/. See also David
Kitchin et al (Eds), Kerly's Law of Trademarks and Trade Names (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001),
13th ed, paras 21-01 to 21-50 for a brief account of domain name disputes and ICANN.
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website displaying a trademark registered in country A, if the trademark
happens to be identical or similar to another one registered in country B, can
be regarded to be an infringement of the trademark in country B. The general
view appears to be that for the purpose of trademark qualification or
infringement, the mere fact that a website may be accessed in a country does
not amount to the trademark displayed therein being used in the country. 0
If an applicant is to claim that his trade name appearing on his website has
acquired distinctiveness through use in the United Kingdom (and hence is
eligible for registration there), he has to establish that he has performed busi-
ness activities there by evidence "for instance in the form of the number and
nature of hits on the applicant's web-site, to support the picture of a pattern
of trade customers in the United Kingdom". 10 On the other hand, a defendant's
website does not infringe the registered trademark in the United Kingdom if
it is clear from the content that it advertises a shop which serves customers in
Ireland.'"0 In Hong Kong, the question arose in Kabushiki Kaisha Yakult Honsha
& Others v Yakudo Group Holdings Ltd. & Another as to whether a defendant's
maintenance of a website by a server in Taiwan infringed the plaintiff's regis-
tered trademark in Hong Kong. Lam J preferred not to answer the question
but instead, granted injunctive relief "by regarding the website and the email
address as instruments of fraud in the passing off sense". 109
Passing Off
As e-commerce becomes more popular, an increase in trademark disputes
involving the Internet can be expected. In Hong Kong, the year 2004 saw
several cases of websites registered overseas passing off as those of local repu-
table banks. If they are cases of genuine business and not fraud, the banks
concerned will have to rely on private international law to seek remedies. If
the defendant's website resembles the plaintiff's in appearance, it is possible
that in addition to passing off, there is a cause of action for infringement of
copyright.
In passing off, the plaintiff has to prove three elements: goodwill, misrep-
resentation and damage." 0 Goodwill is limited by national boundaries
and where a company has goodwill in more than one jurisdiction, passing off
106 See Kerly's (n 105 above), paras 21-51 to 21-58.
107 800 Flowers, Trademark Application, 1-800 Flowers Incorporated v Phonenames Ltd, Court of Appeal,
[2001] EWCA Civ 721, para 131, per Buxton L.J.
108 Euromarket Designs Incorporated v Peters and another, Chancery Division (Transcript), 25 July 2000,
paras 21-25. See also the Scottish case Bonnier Media Ltd v Smith, Outer House, 2003 SC 36,
para 19.
109 [20041 2 HKLRD 587, at para 101 (CFI).
110 See Reckitt (n 43 above).
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is subject to a separate action in each jurisdiction."' For an e-bank or
e-commerce firm which conducts all its business on the Internet and has
established goodwill among Internet users, where is the boundary of its
goodwill? It would seem to be unduly generous to regard it to have goodwill
in all parts of the world with access to the Internet, including countries where
its name is, in practice, unknown to even persons in the same line of business.
On the other hand, if its goodwill is regarded to be limited to those countries
where it has acquired reputation (with or without any actual business being
conducted with the residents there), it can do nothing to protect its hard
earned reputation in one or two countries from being exploited by somebody
else in other countries, thus pre-empting its extension of business into those
countries. If the place where the misrepresentation takes place or targets is
Hong Kong, goodwill may be inferred on the authority of Ten-Ichi." 2 As
pointed out by Wadlow, Ten-Ichi "probably does not represent settled law
even in Hong Kong"."' For the other common law jurisdictions, even
Australia, said to be going the farthest to repudiate the need for a foreign
claimant to have goodwill in the jurisdiction, a "reputation ... of a sufficient
degree" is required.I" In the Hong Kong case Pfizer Inc. v Ultrasound Holdings
Ltd., Suffiad J opined that "Today the better view seems to be that advertis-
ing directed at a specific market in actual preparation for trading does generate
sufficient goodwill to support an action for passing off"."' That appears to
form an equitable basis for determining, in the case of a worldwide e-com-
merce enterprise, whether it does have goodwill in a particular jurisdiction.
If goodwill or sufficient reputation is established in a jurisdiction and dam-
aged (or likely to be damaged) by a misrepresentational website, where does
the misrepresentation take place: at the place where the website is uploaded
or wherever it is accessed by a potential customer? The Canadian ruling in
Society of Composers etc (on copyright) would have it to be the latter. On the
other hand, if comparison is drawn with the English trademark case Euromarket
Designs"' and Scottish trademark case Bonnier Media,"' 7 the misrepresenta-
tion might be taken to have been committed in those places targeted by the
defendant's website. As pointed out by Buxton LJ in 800 Flowers, "(i)t is ...
unlikely, and it is nowhere suggested, that there will be one uniform rule,
" Christopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), pp 154-155.112 See n 61 above.
113 Wadlow (n 111 above) p 173.
114 Ibid., p 168 , citing the words of Lockhart J in Conagra vMcCain Foods, (1992) 23 IPR. 193 (Federal
Court of Australia).
15 Court of First Instance, Action No. 2712 of 1999, 31 Mar 1999, at para 17. Available on Judiciary's
website www.judiciary.gov.hk, last visited on 15 May 2005.
116 See n 108 above, paras 21-25.
117 See n 108 above, paras 19 and 20.
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specific to the Internet, that can be applied in all cases of Internet use"."' As
far as the law of passing off in Hong Kong and England (and probably that in
the common law jurisdictions) is concerned, since passing off is committed
where damage or likelihood of damage is sustained, the precise place where
misrepresentation takes place is immaterial. In practice, though, the area tar-
geted by the defendant is likely to overlap with that in which damage or
likelihood of damage to goodwill is sustained.
Trade Secrets
In the discussions under Scenarios A to D above, it is suggested that the
unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential information, as breach of an
equitable obligation, does not fall within Order 11 unless the infringing act
takes place in Hong Kong. On the other hand, if action is framed as the tort
of conversion of property, the double actionability rule applies and the courts
have jurisdiction only if the act is civilly actionable in the place where it is
committed. Hence, if any Internet content amounts to such unauthorised use
or disclosure, whether the case is justiciable in Hong Kong depends on where
the act is regarded to have been committed. There appears to be no judicial
ruling on the question yet. As a defendant should be aware of his obligation
and its breach would potentially cause serious damage to the plaintiff - bear-
ing in mind that for some enterprises, notably in the innovative industries,
trade secrets may constitute their main or even only assets - the policy con-
sideration would point to a rule conferring the widest jurisdiction on the court.
This suggests that if the infringing material is contained in an e-mail, the
infringing act should be regarded to have been committed at any of the fol-
lowing places: where the defendant is physically located when he causes the
message to be sent, where he intends the message to be received and where
the message is actually read by the intended recipient. In case the infringing
materials are uploaded onto a website, it appears to be fair to regard the
infringing act to take place at the place of uploading as well as the place
where any downloading has occurred.
Where an action against unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential
information is founded on breach of contract, the significance of the place of
the breach is that if the breach is committed in Hong Kong, the courts will
have jurisdiction under rule 1(1)(b) and (e) even though the contract is not
made in Hong Kong nor contains any term to confer jurisdiction on the Hong
Kong courts. The same policy considerations and suggestions as in the pre-
ceding paragraph are applicable here in determining where the breach is
committed.
1" See n 107 above, para 136.
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Internet Service Providers' Liability
In the above discussions, the defendant is confined to the content provider,
ie the person who uploads infringing materials onto the Internet. The con-
tent provider, especially if domiciled overseas, may be difficult to track down.
A plaintiff may find it expedient to act against the Internet service provider
in whose server the infringing materials are stored. If the ISP is domiciled in
Hong Kong and served a writ, the plaintiff may be able to act against the
content provider, in a case otherwise outside the scope of rule 1(1), under
head (c), ie "the claim is brought against a person duly served within or out of
the jurisdiction and a person out of the jurisdiction is a necessary or proper
party thereto". A pre-requisite to invoking this head is to show a case against
the ISP.
As far as copyright is concerned, ISPs are protected by section 26 of the
Copyright Ordinance, which provides that "(t)he mere provision of physical
facilities for enabling the making available of copies of works to the public
does not of itself constitute an act of making available of copies of works to
the public". Under section 2.4 of the Canadian Copyright Act, an ISP who
does no more than "providing the means of telecommunication necessary for
another person to so communicate" is not regarded to be communicating
infringing materials."' In the United States, the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act of 1998, which adds a new section 512 to the Copyright Act, exempts
an ISP from liability to copyright infringement if he implements a policy of
terminating the accounts of repeat infringers.120 Section 12 of the European
Electronic Commerce Directive provides that ISPs who are mere conduits
are not liable for information transmitted "provided that the information is
not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the
transmission"."' As it is impracticable for ISPs to monitor the materials trans-
mitted over their networks, one may take it that they are exempted, around
the world, from liability to copyright infringement except that in some
jurisdictions, the exemption does not apply if they refuse to remove infring-
ing materials after receiving notification of infringement.
For actions founded on trademark infringement, passing off and misuse of
confidential information, the ISP's liability is much less uncertain. We can
only take as reference the decision in defamation cases. In the US, ISPs enjoy
immunity "to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for
119 See Society of Composers etc. (n 99 above), para 101.
120 "The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: US Copyright Office Summary", pp 8-11. Avail-
able on www.loc.gov/copyright/legislation/dmca.pdf, last visited on 17 May 2005.
121 "Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2000/31/EC", art. 12(2). Reproduced in
Jeremy Phillips (ed), Butterworths E-commerce and IT Law Handbook (London, Edinburgh, Dublin:
Butterworths, 2000).
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information originating with third-party user of the service".m' However, in
the United Kingdom, it was held in Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd that an ISP
was a publisher and as such, was liable to defamation when it failed to remove
defamatory materials from its website despite notice from the plaintiff.123 The
case reflected the English rule that, if defamatory material is passed by A to B
who in turn transmits it to someone other than the plaintiff victim, B is guilty
of "publishing" libel unless he can prove that he is ignorant of the contents of
the material. If the material is IP infringing instead of defamatory, it is
doubtful that B can be regarded to have infringed a trademark, made misrep-
resentation or used or disclosed confidential information without its owner's
consent. Even assuming that a plaintiff of trademark infringement etc. can
persuade the court that there is a serious issue in respect of the ISP, the ISP is
playing merely a passive role and the principal defendant should, arguably, be
the person who posts the infringing materials. If so and the claim should have
been principally brought against that person, the requirement of rule 1(1) (c)
is not met."'
Conclusion
The lack of clear authorities on the enforcement of foreign intellectual prop-
erty rights, the different possible interpretations of the double actionability
rule and the question whether a proprietary right subsists in confidential in-
formation have contributed to the uncertainties in the courts' jurisdiction in
some of the scenarios discussed above. The uncertainties multiply when the
territorially-based jurisdictional rules are applied to the borderless nature of
the Internet. Indeed, even if such uncertainties could be clarified through
local legislation, it might not provide much help to a plaintiff since the local
courts' jurisdiction will not necessarily be recognised by - and hence, their
judgment enforceable in - foreign countries.
International co-operation is necessary. Efforts among European countries
have resulted in the 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the Brussels Convention)
and the 1988 Lugano Convention." They do not adequately address the
special problems relating to intellectual property cases, not to mention those
122 Zeran v American Online, 958 F Supp 1124 (ED va. 1997), affirmed 129 F 3rd 327 (4th Cir 1997), at
p 330, quoted in United Kingdom Law Commission, Defamation and the Internet: A Preliminary
Investigation, Scoping Study No 2, Dec 2002, para 2.53.
123 [2001] QB 201.
124 Cheshire and North, (n labove), pp 300-302.
125 See Cheshire & North, ibid., Chapter 11.
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involving the Internet."' Worldwide, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law attempted, for a decade without success, to draw up the
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Cases.'27 Intellectual property was a controversial issue when
the draft was discussed.128 A much scaled down version - the Hague Conven-
tion on Exclusive Choice of Courts Agreement - has been drafted instead to
deal with cases in which commercial parties have chosen a court in their
business-to-business contracts." ' A diplomatic conference was scheduled to
be held in June 2005 to conclude the negotiation of the revised draft in June
2005.0 Cases where the validity of a registered intellectual property right is
the principal issue is excluded from the scope of the draft Convention."'
The borderless nature of the Internet has prompted cyberlibertarians to
advocate that national governments should leave the cyber community to be
regulated by itself.3 2 There are also suggestions for a set of international law
for the cyberspace and even the establishment of a special tribunal to deal
with Internet law disputes.' Such proposals are unrealistic. There is little
hope of national governments giving up their sovereignty on a media which
impacts on everyday life. Nor is there any prospect, in the foreseeable future,
of key international players putting their heads together to address the juris-
dictional issues relating to the enforcement of intellectual property rights
over the Internet.
126 See James Fawcett, "Special Rules of Private International Law for Special Cases: What Should We
Do about Intellectual Property?" in James Fawcett (ed.), Reform and Development of Private Interna-
tional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Chapter 6, pp 137-166.
127 See John J. Barcelo III and Kevin M. Clermont (Eds), A Global Law of Jurisdiction and judgments:
Lessons from The Hague (The Hague, London, New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002).
128 See Hague Conference of Private Information Law, "Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in
Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001", footnotes 80 to 88
and the related draft provisions. Available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm2001draft
e.pdf, last visited on 24 June 2005.
129 See American Library Association website at http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/WOissues/copyrightb/
intlcopyright/haugeconvention.htm#back. Last visited on 4 June 2005.
130 Department of Justice, "An Update on the Draft Hague Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court
Agreements", Mar 2005. Available on www.doj.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/draft-hague-convention.pdf.,
last visited on 4 June 2005.
13' Department of Justice, "Concise Summary of Significant Changes made to the Draft Text of the
Hague Convention on Exclusive Choice of Courts Agreement", Mar 2005, para 2. Available on
www.doj.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/concisesummary.pdf, Last visited on 4 June 2005.
132 For example, John Perry Barlow, "A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace", 8 Feb 1996.
Available at http://homes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html, last visited on 5 June 2005.
133 Darrel C Menthe, "Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces", (1998) 4 Mich.
Telecomm. Tech L Rev 69. Also, Matthew Burnstein, "A Global Network in a Compartmentalised
Legal Environment" in Katharina Boele-Woelki and Catherine Keswedjian, Internet: Which
Court Decides? Which Law Applies? (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998),
pp 23-34.
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